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Turkish organisations in Europe: how national contexts provide different 
avenues for participation. 
 
Pontus Odmalm 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The purpose of this article is three-fold. First, to identify opportunities and 
constraints for migrants to participate in the host society. Second, by using Turkish 
migrants as a case study, to further explore variance in formal political participation. 
Turks are one of the largest migrant groups in Western Europe and have settled in 
several European countries. Since a majority of the Turkish migrants display 
similarities in terms migration and socio-economic background, this provides an 
ample opportunity to analyse the outcome of different integration policies and the 
extent of political integration of Turks in Europe. Finally, the article assesses how 
different citizenship policies give rise to different types of participation and different 
targets for claims-making. 
The article will first discuss how different understandings of citizenship and 
implementations of citizenship policy give rise to a different set of opportunities for 
migrants to participate in the political sphere. This will then be exemplified with 
reference to Turkish organisations in Germany, France and the Netherlands. Not only 
do a majority of the European Turks reside in these countries but these states have 
also chosen very different paths in terms of integration and citizenship policies. This 
results in a different set of opportunities for Turks to formally participate where some 
countries have more favourable policies than others.  
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Introduction 
 
Migration in Western Europe has steadily become more and more diverse in terms of 
origin and reasons for migrating. Migration that was often supposed to be temporary, 
e.g. the post-war labour migration, has in many cases led to semi-permanent 
settlement. Continued chain-migration of family members has contributed to the 
presence of second and third generation migrants which has prompted states, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, to find ways to incorporate migrants into the polity. 
 Although differences in terms of citizenship acquisition are still prominent, a 
number of civil, social and politics rights have gradually been made available to 
resident third country nationals. This partial dissociation of nationality and 
citizenship, on the one hand, and identities and rights, on the other, poses particular 
challenges to nation-states1 (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2002; Bloemraad et al, 2008). 
However, it also provides migrants with a number of different avenues to participate 
politically in the host society.  
 It will therefore be important to take into consideration how different types of 
host society institutions, or structures, give rise to different types of political 
opportunities and ways of participating. The most obvious marker is whether formal 
political participation, for example voting, is dependent on being a national. If this is 
the case then non-nationals will be prevented from having an influence on who 
governs and will be excluded from a key arena of political engagement. In addition, if 
an exclusive citizenship policy, exemplified by e.g. Germany pre-2000, becomes 
liberalised, this could alter the electoral landscape in terms of party competition for 
the migrant vote2 (Yurdakul, 2006).  
In practice the citizen/non-citizen distinction is not always clear cut and 
nation-states often provide some type of formal political rights to non-nationals. In 
Britain, for example, non-nationals from Ireland and Commonwealth migrants enjoy 
national voting rights whereas in Sweden and the Netherlands, resident third country 
nationals are allowed to vote in local elections after three (Sweden) and five years (the 
Netherlands) of residence. Most commonly, however, national level voting rights is 
the privilege of nationals and local voting rights for third country nationals are the 
exception rather then the rule. .  
 Although the importance of citizenship has been viewed to be declining in the 
post-national era3 (Soysal, 1994), there is also evidence showing citizenship to be on 
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the offensive4 (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). This is most notable in the way that 
states are beginning to emphasis citizenship as a reward rather than as a tool of 
integration. This shift indicates that non-nationals are under increasing pressure to 
show that they are potential citizens through the introduction of formal and informal 
integrations requirements. These requirements are indicative of how citizenship once 
again is becoming a focal interest for nation-states5 (Odmalm, 2007).   
This new situation of tightening access to the polity by making naturalisation 
more difficult gives for an interesting paradox among liberal democracies. On the one 
hand, the formal exclusion of groups due to their non-national status is identified as a 
problem, and on the other, citizenship is becoming more exclusive and may 
disproportionably affect the very groups that are considered to be at risk of exclusion.  
 The aim of this article is therefore threefold. First, it will focus on different 
citizenship policies and understandings of citizenship in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Second, the outcomes of these different policies will be discussed in 
relation to how they provide sets of opportunities for migrants to participate 
(conventional or non-conventional forms) as well as determining the level where 
these claims are aimed (host state, supra-state or home-land) . Finally, the article will 
utilise a key migrant group in Europe – the Turks – as an illustrative example of how 
different citizenship policies give rise to different types of participation and different 
directions of claims-making. The article will initially discuss the backdrop to Turkish 
migration to Europe and then go on to how different states have responded to this 
group in terms of citizenship policies and access to rights and, finally, what 
opportunities these settings give rise to for participation.   
 
 
Turkish migration to Europe  
 
Turks constitute one of the largest migrant groups in Europe with around four million 
located primarily in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and 
Austria. Turks are also one of the longest settled migrant groups in the post-war 
period, on par with migrants from the Caribbean and Indian sub-continent in Britain.  
 There is however variance in terms of settlement patterns with The 
Netherlands and Germany having a much higher number of resident Turks and their 
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offspring (12 and 25 per cent respectively) compared to the 5 per cent that Turks 
amount to in France6 (Guigni and Passy, 2004).  
 The German case provides a textbook example of recruiting migrants as 
‘guest-workers’ and the Turkish community is very much rooted in this particular 
migration history. When the recession hit following the oil crisis in the early 1970s 
and the recruitment ban was initiated, Turks amounted to just over four million and 
the German government was faced with a difficult task of how to reduce any further 
inflow of dependents from Turkey. Several restrictive measures were put in place 
such as differential child benefit payments and restrictions on employment by family 
members (Avci, 2006), which was in line with Germany’s resistance to view itself as 
a country of immigration7. Paradoxically, the policies that were supposed to 
encourage Turks to return instead contributed to continued migration, especially in 
terms of family reunification which, while not actively encouraged, was still allowed8 
(Green, 2007).  
 The Netherlands and France were comparatively late in recruiting foreign 
labour migrants, having initially relied on colonial migration for these purposes. The 
consequences of this strategy meant less foreign-born migrants in the Dutch labour 
force but with an over-representation of non-European labour migrants, where the 
Turks were one of the key groups. In France, Turkish migration only got started after 
the official stop to migrant labour in 1974 but has been mainly dominated by political 
refugees from the early 1980s. In a similar vein to Germany, labour migrants in the 
Netherlands were initially meant to be short-term but the measures to regulate and 
control migration were less stringent then the German counterparts resulting in 
migration becoming semi-permanent relatively early on9 (Odmalm, 2005). As in 
Germany, Turkish migration increased after the official labour halt in 1973 due to 
family reunification making Turks the third largest migrant in the Netherlands10 
(Tillie and Slijper, 2007).  
 
 
Citizenship policies and institutional arrangements for participation 
 
Citizenship is a key marker in the relationship between the state and the individual. 
The citizen status sets out the rights and obligations which are appointed to the 
individuals perceived as members of that particular society. Citizenship also allows 
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these individuals to take full advantage of the political rights associated with this 
status. A common approach in the literature has been to classify states’ policies and 
understandings of citizenship according to three ideal types. These typologies are said 
to “define a particular institutional and discursive setting for political contention over 
migration and ethnic relations” (Koopmans and Statham, 2000:30) and distinguish 
between ethno-cultural and civic-cultural understandings of citizenship and formal 
access to citizenship11.  
The first of these, labelled the ‘exclusive’ or ‘ethnic’ model, provides an 
institutional set-up which either denies or makes it very difficult for migrants to gain 
access to the political community through the adoption of a jus sanguinis principle of 
citizenship12 (Brubaker, 1992). Germany pre-2000 is often used as an illustration of 
this approach. France exemplifies that second typology, the so-called ‘assimilationist’ 
or ‘republican’ model, which provides easy access to naturalization through a jus soli 
principle and semi-automatic citizenship for children of immigrant parents. The 
flipside is that citizenship comes with strong pressures on migrants to assimilate 
culturally and with little recognition of difference in the public sphere13 (Favell, 
1998). Finally, the ‘multicultural’ model, which provides relatively easy access to 
naturalization and some rights for cultural difference in the public sphere. The 
Netherlands did for long time conform to this model but has made some dramatic 
changes in terms of policy over the last decade thus becoming more similar to France 
by limiting the public recognition of ethnic identities.  
 The models intend to give us some indication of how receiving states perceive 
their new population. Furthermore, the typologies also provide us with an 
understanding of the opportunities available for political participation, the type of 
participatory acts that migrants engage in and where this participation is directed. 
However, these models inhabit certain limitations which make them problematic to 
use analytically.  First, since states are classified in a dichotomous fashion, the 
typologies ignore or oversimplify the complex realities of how nation-states perceive 
nationhood and belonging and how they construct citizenship policies. Second, states 
may also change their policies over time - becoming either more liberal or more 
restrictive - which is not fully accounted for by these models. Finally, the models do 
not fully account for intra-state dynamics in terms of how different political actors 
compete for change in policies and understandings of citizenship14 (Koopmans and 
Statham, 2000). These limitations are highlighted if we consider how formal 
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naturalisation policies have been arranged. The three countries considered in this 
article display a number of similarities in this area even though the models would 
suggest that they should not. For example, access to nationality in all three countries 
is provided through 1) the jus sanguinis principle as well as 2) through recognition or 
legitimisation (e.g. through marriage) and through 3) naturalisation. However, there 
are variations in terms what the countries specify in terms of duration of stay and 
acceptance of dual nationality. There are also further similarities in terms of the 
additional so-called ‘integration requirements’ which are becoming more common in 
state policy15 (see further Odmalm, 2007). These similarities are part of a pan-
European trend to upgrade citizenship by emphasising the civic integration of, 
especially Muslim, migrants which has gained momentum following post-2001 
concerns about failing integration16 (Joppke, 2007).  
To understand these similarities, Koopmans and Statham (2000) have 
suggested a two-dimensional conceptualisation of citizenship which to a greater 
extent captures these dynamic relationships17. This conceptual space is defined by a 
formal and a cultural dimension of citizenship. The vertical axis runs from an 
understanding of citizenship that favours ethno-cultural bonds as the basis for the 
political community to one that emphasises a civic political culture based on 
residence. The horizontal axis runs from citizenship understood as conforming to a 
single cultural model embraced by all citizens to a culturally pluralist conception that 
retains or encourages cultural diversity. This conceptualisation gives rise to a scale 
ranging from, on the one hand, civic republicanism – ethnic assimilation and, on the 
other, civic pluralism – ethnic segregation.  
Viewing citizenship regimes in this way allows us to classify states as 
corresponding more or less to these ideal-types. It also highlights some of the 
commonalities shared by countries that would otherwise be considered as polar 
opposites. For example, both Germany and the Netherlands offered migrant children 
the possibility of education in their own language. However, in the German case this 
was intended as a way to facilitate re-integration upon return whereas in the 
Netherlands the same policy was intended to support and preserve a minority 
language within Dutch society. Similarly, we can use the typology to position 
different countries in terms of where the emphasis is placed and why countries are 
starting to introduce additional requirements such as language proficiency; loyalty to 
the constitution and/or that migrants need to show that they are sufficiently integrated. 
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At the same time, the Koopmans/Statham typology helps us to understand the 
different nature of migrant mobilisation and the various positions adopted by actors.  
But citizenship is not only a means by which rights and duties are allocated, but more 
importantly, it also marks the type of relationship that the state has with its 
newcomers. It is thus important to also consider the symbolic labelling that is placed 
on migrants. This enables us to understand the nature of claims-making (e.g. to 
improve migrants’ status in the host society or to gain further recognition for cultural 
rights) and where the claims are being directed (host state, supra-state or home-land).  
France defines newcomers as ‘immigrants’, Germany refers to immigrants as 
‘foreigners’ while the Netherlands has adopted the term ‘ethnic minority’. Despite 
using the same term, the interpretation and definition of, for example, ‘immigrant’ 
differs between countries. Comparing the French understanding of an ‘immigrant’ to 
its Swedish counterpart is particularly illuminating. In Sweden, the statistical 
definition refers to persons born abroad and to Swedish-born persons both of whose 
parents were born abroad. An immigrant in France, on the other hand, refers to 
persons born abroad but is at the same time used to indicate a status prior to becoming 
French or, more informally, to persons who are perceived as being unable to 
assimilate. Similarly, ‘ethnic minority’ as used in the Dutch context differs 
remarkably from, for example, the British. In the former, the term is based on 
objective criteria (place of birth of self and parents) and is used for socioeconomic 
monitoring of these groups by the Dutch authorities. In the latter, the term is used to 
signify geographical or ethnic origin (for example ‘Asian’, ‘Black’ and ‘White’) 
through self-identification in census surveys. 
 These different national understandings of citizenship and ways of officially 
defining migrants give rise to very different possibilities for participation and may 
also have a structuring effect on the type of issues that migrants choose to mobilise 
around. Guigni and Passy (2004) point to how the institutional environment is crucial 
in order to understand how migrants participate18. In France, they suggest, the 
assimlationist emphasis and inclusive nature of membership gives rise to, on the one 
hand, claims that relate to recognition for ethnic and cultural difference, and on the 
other, a more radical form of mobilisation due the closed institutional opportunities. 
In Germany, where citizenship policy for a long time made it more or less impossible 
for migrants to naturalise and thus become part of the political community, the lack of 
formal political opportunities have led migrants to develop alternative and more civil 
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society orientated means of participation. This indirect type of engagement coupled 
with a ‘foreigner’ status meant that claims were made in order to improve the status of 
migrants vis-à-vis the German state or to by-pass the state by aiming for the EU 
level19 (Kastoryano, 1998). In contrast, the Dutch multicultural model of relatively 
easy access to naturalisation and emphasis on migrants being able to retain the 
cultural uniqueness was complemented by a number of consultative bodies for the 
recognised minorities to be able to assert influence on policies (Rath, 1983).   
 The view adopted by Guigni and Massy is many ways symptomatic for what 
has been written on migration and political integration in recent years. This approach 
has been adapted from the literature on political opportunity structures which focused 
on political institutions and social movements20 (Tarrow, 1994; see also Kitschelt, 
1986; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). Accordingly, the state provides a 
number of institutional settings that make up the political environment and determines 
the rules and boundaries that political actors are obliged to adhere to. In this 
environment there are certain conditions which can either facilitate or constrain the 
political opportunities that these actors face when they pursue their strategic goals. 
But these opportunities are not only determined by the presence of the state. Other 
factors include specific configurations of resources and historical precedents which 
determine how and what type of groups mobilise. Studying and identifying these 
opportunities and constraints for participation sheds light on the differences of 
migrant mobilisation and how the contextual structures influence political behaviour.  
 In terms of the political institutions that provide the space available for 
contestation, a first distinction to make relates to the extent to which France, Germany 
and the Netherlands display corporatist or pluralist characteristics. The key distinction 
is whether a liberal polity is dominated by a monopolised and centralised system of 
interest organisation in which the state formally designates and recognises only a 
limited number of encompassing interests (corporatist) or multiple, overlapping, 
spontaneously formed, voluntaristically supported, easily abandoned, and politically 
autonomous associations (pluralist)21 (Schmitter, 1981). The configuration of the 
polity in this way provides particular types of settings that shape the form of migrant 
mobilisation.  
 While the Netherlands can be said to conform mainly to a corporatist model 
with a few, state recognised bodies that represent particular social categories of 
society, Germany falls in-between while France displays few to none corporatist traits  
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German political life has furthermore been dominated by the dividing lines of 
class and religion which has, until the entry of the Greens, created a two-tier system 
with parties representing the broad categories of capital – labour and religious – 
secular groups. However, explicit political competition and conflict has by and large 
been absent in Germany due to what Conradt (2001) describes as a striving for 
absolute solutions in order to eliminate the causes of conflict22. This aversion of 
conflict has thus led to both the elite as well as the general public being unable to 
accept the need for strong opposition parties or extensive bargaining within and 
between parties in parliament, opting for a more expert-orientated and legalistic 
conception of politics.  
Consequently, this has generated a strong state presence in the political order 
that has generated a public sphere which is both highly centralised and bureaucratic 
despite its federal political system. Furthermore, the corporatist elements present in 
the German system provides opportunities for class and religious interests such as 
trade unions, welfare organisations, churches, business organisations, and so on, to 
participate in public policy-making23 (Soysal, 1994). At the same time, migrants and 
minorities are excluded from decision-making and influence by the exclusive nature 
of German citizenship as well as the limitations for the dominating cleavages to 
incorporate an ethnic as well as the, primarily, Islamic dimension24 (Koopmans and 
Statham, 1999). 
The institutional arrangement in Germany, with limited corporatist influence, 
is also reflected in its way of organising resident migrants. Migrant organisations are 
not given a special role or status in the integration policy formulation and formal links 
with organisations, similar to those found in the Netherlands, are less well established. 
Instead, labour unions and churches play a more prominent role than migrant 
organisations. In addition, few provisions exist on a federal level for the collective 
participation of migrants, although due to the institutional nature of the German 
polity, one finds significant variance on a municipal level depending on whether the 
local government is positively orientated towards these organisations or not. In 
addition, there is also a high degree of variance in terms of funding for migrant 
organisations, which is often left to the discretion of the local government25 (Berger et 
al., 2004; Koopmans, 2004). Therefore Germany displays a relatively large amount of 
migrant organisations but of a very fragmented nature lacking the centralised and 
representative character of the Netherlands26 (Soysal, 1994). However, regional 
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differences are vast with the more liberal and multiculturally orientated cities, such as 
Berlin and Hamburg, have created favourable settings for funding of organisations 
and establishing links between migrant organisations, governmental bodies and 
political actors. These differences in host society settings and attitudes open up for a 
variety of roles and levels of engagement for organisations. Yurdakul (2006) points to 
this in her study of Turkish associations in Berlin where the more open attitude of 
Berlin’s political elite has resulted in close working relationships with certain Turkish 
associations, primarily in the area of integration27. However, in line with the 
dominating class cleavage in Germany, the Turkish organisations on the left, and 
especially the Social Democratic ones, have established close links with the SPD and 
also managed to secure more state funding compared to the more conservative and 
trans-nationally oriented organisations.  
The Netherlands has traditionally displayed a much higher number of 
corporatist features compared to France and Germany, both with regard to general 
policy-making as well as in the area of integration. This process has involved the 
assertion of individual influence through party channels as well as that of group 
influence via organisations. These settings constitute a particular institutional 
framework driven by a top-down perspective where the government recognises and 
identifies the needs and rights of immigrants and thus provide the context in which 
immigrants and their interests are organised. The state allocates certain functions – 
such as interest representation and consultative participation – thereby creating a 
unified and bureaucratic network. Even spontaneous and oppositional movements are 
incorporated into this scheme by being dependent on state funding28 (Soysal, 1994). 
 . In France, migrant organisations are primarily not based on single ethnicities 
but are rather built up of cross-ethnic membership and usually located on the national 
level as in, for example, the case of SOS Racisme or represent cross-national ethnic 
groups (such as the Maghrebian organisation France-Plus). As with the key Turkish 
organisations in Germany, migrant organisations in France have traditionally 
established close links with parties on the left as a consequence of migrating for 
labour purposes and thus forming part of a French working class. Although France 
has relaxed its views on ethnic organisations, these are relatively scarce (at least 
compared to Germany and the Netherlands) as a consequence of the lack of 
recognition for ethnicity in French citizenship discourse and the dominance of four 
particular cleavage lines in the post-war era: class, religion (traditionally between 
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secular-clerical but today more around Christianity-Islam), foreign policy 
(protectionism–EU integration) and form of governance (presidential – 
parliamentary)29 (Wahlbäck, 1991). This has led to migrants being predominantly 
organised and unified with respect to specific political issues. These tend to be related 
to ethnicity and cultural-religious concerns, functioning outside of mainstream politics 
and as such emerge as a response to the particular political climate and environment. 
In this respect, they very much correspond to how interests and discontent are 
generally manifested in the French polity through what Mény calls ‘the periodic 
eruption of violence and protest that contradict or counterbalance choices expressed 
through the ballot box’30 (1996: 107). The reasons for this, Mény suggests, can be 
found in the institutional set-up of French society which through its exclusivity has 
not managed to channel violent social protests into peaceful and formal expressions. 
Parties, unions and interest groups have had difficulties to effectively organise group 
activity as a consequence of the extremely varied electoral rules. This has led to 
fragmented formation of wings and factions within parties and has made it difficult to 
set up alliances. Therefore in order to be heard, contenders must resort to extreme 
measures, such as violent demonstrations or large-scale strikes, which have been 
proven to pay off. This is due to the paradoxical nature of the French state which is on 
one hand haughty, all-powerful and disdainful but faced with violent protests tends to 
become ready to concede and forgiving since there is no other way out31 (see also 
Andrews and Hoffman, 1981).  
 
Outcomes of institutions: how do they structure political behaviour? 
Organised migrant interests and they way in which they mobilise are thus often 
understood to be a consequence of the particular organisational models provided by 
the host society. These models and institutions not only impact on the way these 
claims are made (conventional/non-conventional) but also, as Ireland (1994) has 
argued, direct these claims towards particular levels (host state, supra-state or home-
land oriented)32. A point furthermore acknowledged by Soysal (1994:86), “[h]ost 
societies shape the collective organization of migrants by providing (or not) certain 
resources for and models of organizing/…/ certain host society institutions and 
policies encourage collective identity and organization”33. In other words, the 
presence or absence of particular opportunities for political engagement provides 
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migrant organisations with certain political cues from which they define their goals 
and strategies in relation to the host society.  
The emphasis on mobilisation as a response to the political environment 
provides a different focus compared to the two previously dominating paradigms 
regarding the relationship between migrants/minorities and collective action. The first 
suggests a class-based approach where the underprivileged structural and socio-
economic position of migrants has a direct consequence for their degree of 
mobilisation and underlying motives. According to this line of thought, economic 
divisions within the working class are seen as racialised under the structural crisis of 
advanced industrial capitalism which transforms a common race or ethnicity into a 
class of its own and serves as a common identity for political participation and as a 
form of emerging, but false, class consciousness. This precarious situation can only be 
overcome by co-operating with the indigenous working class through trade unions 
and labour parties, where the race category becomes subordinate to the more general 
class category. The second explanation – the ethnicity/race paradigm – takes an 
opposite stance, advocating that the ethnic class is not so much a display of false 
consciousness but rather a continuous form of collective action independent from 
class. Here, shared experiences, such as racism and discrimination, distinguish 
migrants from the host society’s population34 (Castles and Kosack, 1974; Rex et al., 
1979).  
. However, the ultimate causes of behaviour – class and ethnicity – are taken 
as given and not related to the political specifics of the particular country contexts. 
Both approaches assume that migrants will tend to behave in a similar fashion 
regardless of the political institutional framework35 (Koopmans and Statham, 2000).  
In contrast, the political opportunity approach suggests that collective action is 
determined by external events, the availability of resources and opportunities made 
available by changes in the institutional setting. The key issue here is that the 
opportunity approach places group mobilisation in a political context and provides an 
explanation as to why mobilisation takes a certain appearance and when and why it is 
successful rather than why it originally emerges. Furthermore, this model also 
predicts that the amount and type of group formation are a direct outcome of the 
particular structure of political institutions and the construction of political power in a 
given society36 (Tarrow, 1996). Thus, it is when changes occur in the external 
opportunities that we are more likely to observe group action and formation. If 
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powerful groups change their attitudes against politically marginalised groups, these 
groups should respond to this opening by increasing group action, founding new 
organisations and using these as channels for mobilisation. This perspective originally 
builds on the resource mobilisation theory of collective action which focused on the 
perceived cost and benefits of alternative strategies and the need for resource 
mobilisation prior to mobilisation. The impact stemming from the shift from local to 
national power structures on organisational forms and types of collective action 
makes an important addition to the understanding of the social and political terrain 
that forms the condition for the emergence and success of modern movements37 
(Kitschelt, 1986). 
 It is however important to note that migrant organisations are also 
qualitatively different from other types of voluntary organisations in terms of their 
aims and functions. In terms of organisational aims, migrant associations can be said 
to serve four characteristic purposes. First, migrant organisations can act as a link 
between the sending country and the receiving one in that they can provide advisory 
services for future migrants. This means that the organisation could potentially act as 
an intermediary or an alternative for the complex bureaucracy in that it can offer first-
hand experience of the migration process in the host country. In addition, they can 
also have a cushioning function, that is, they can ‘soften’ the shock of transition by 
offering a setting in which immigrants could meet fellow-nationals and speak their 
own language. Organisations can also maintain the interaction among immigrants. 
This is especially relevant for migrants who lack informal ties, therefore they may 
attempt to forge formal ties so as to retain some form of bonding38 (Cordero-
Guzman, 2001).  
Second, organisations can function as an alternative or complement to the state 
in terms of integration and adaptation to the new society. If an organisation or a 
number of them are able to set up well-functioning relationships with authorities 
responsible for integration policies, migrant associations can potentially facilitate 
integration. This could include providing information about the host country in the 
native language, or acting as a link between migrants and different socio-economic 
areas of society and/or the political world. In this way, organisations allow migrants 
to practice the ways of the host society in an ethnic setting. As such, they can thus be 
used as a ‘training school’ for further political participation in the host society. Third, 
migrant associations, if part of an established network, can serve as a unified voice for 
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their particular ethnic group in relation to the host society. Organisations can be used 
to translate the group’s consensus on certain subjects. The extent to which immigrants 
cluster in organisations is also an important indicator for measuring the extent of a 
collective (or collectively expressed) identity. The character, number and size of 
organisations indicate the extent to which immigrants intend to profile themselves as 
different, or are seen by others as different. Organisations can thus be viewed as an 
expression of the collectively felt identity of their members. They can be defensive (as 
a response to exclusion) or offensive (stemming from a choice of immigrants to set 
themselves apart from others). Furthermore, one should make a distinction between 
organisations that aim at enforcing the ethnic identity and those that encourage 
integration. Offensive organisations will often have as their goal the retaining of an 
identity, whereas defensive organisations have strategy rather than identity as their 
main goal, where strategy can either be stressing or eliminating difference39 
(Vermeulen, 2005a). The concentration of migrants and their home-country-based 
social networks are viewed as crucial to their organising on the basis of ethnic 
attributes. Finally, migrant organisations can play an important role for the 
maintenance of a linkage between the ethnic group and the country or region of 
origin, especially in a diaspora type of situation. Also, they can serve as contact points 
between ethnic communities in different settler countries. This last characteristic has 
been particularly dominant amongst Turkish communities residing in different 
European countries40 (Schrover, 2003). 
However, Ostergaard-Nielsen (2000) suggests that the way in which Turks 
organise also tends to be less dependent host society institutions and more related to 
their socioeconomic position in the host society, developments in Turkey and 
developments in European-Turkish relations41. This situation, Ostergaard-Nielsen 
continues, is exemplified by the multitude of Turkish organisations in Germany that 
display a vast variety of political backgrounds and affiliations. In part they reflect the 
political affiliation of the Turkish migrants ranging from radical left and right-wing 
nationalist to more mainstream and moderate organisations42 (see also Yurdakul, 
2006). In addition, there is also a large body of religious organisations such as the 
Alevis which developed in response to discrimination by the Sunni majority. 
Similarly, the Turkish Sunnis have developed a number of organisations around a 
secular form of Islam in the same vein as practiced by the Turkish state. This in turn 
has given rise to competing organisations formed by Milli Görüs which by and large 
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opposed the division of church and state. However, as argued above, whether Turkish 
organisations are more engaged in homeland or host society issues will be influenced 
by the structural conditions and opportunities available for participation. In Germany, 
naturalisation has traditionally been restrictive which has excluded many Turks from 
the mainstream political arena thus giving rise to two main types of political 
engagements. Either in the transnational activities described by Ostergaard-Nielsen or 
as trying to push for change in their status in Germany. At the same time, local 
conditions, as discussed by Yurdakul (2006), may allow for more inclusive 
participation in terms of co-operation with German authorities to improve processes 
of integration43.  
In the Netherlands, Turks have also imported their homeland politics to Dutch 
organisational life generating similar left-right and religiously oriented associations. 
However, it was not until the early 1980s that Dutch authorities began to seriously 
consider Turkish organisations in the same vein as the more established Surinamese 
counterparts. The new policy that was introduced aimed at promoting and preserving 
cultural identities; to emancipate their constituencies and to represent community 
interests. Furthermore, these new policies opened up a much more favourable funding 
climate for Turkish organisations in the Netherlands and also gave these organisations 
an enhanced status and legitimacy44 (Vermeulen, 2005b). Although Turks in many 
European countries have been described as being ideologically split and having 
difficulties uniting45 (see e.g. Yalcin-Heckman, 1997),  van Heelsum’s (2005) study 
on Turkish associations in the Netherlands, finds that despite political and religious 
cleavages, a significant number of Turkish associations are in fact interconnected with 
each other through a cohesive network of interlocking board members46. These 
changes in the way in which Turkish organisations were viewed by the Dutch 
authorities very much corresponds to the opportunities set out in Dutch citizenship 
policy which aimed at inclusion and emancipation through civil society engagement.  
In comparison, migrant (as well as non-migrant) associations in France have a 
weaker civil society position where the French state has been prone to advocate and 
fund general organisations that cater for a cross-section of the population. Voluntary 
organisations have become more involved in local and regional level decision-making 
as equal partners but are at the same time in a weak position in that they are subject to 
local authorities or government agencies to ‘ok’ them and then admitting them within 
their orbit47 (Cole, 1998). However, this situation changed in the early 1980s when 
 16
following the abolishment of legal restrictions on migrant associations, the 
opportunities for starting up migrant organisations have increased. Although these 
organisations often lack national representation and do not tend to represent a united 
front. Turkish associations in France also differ numerically in relation to Germany 
and the Netherlands due to Turks being a relatively small migrant group. This has 
created a different scenario in France in that the ideological (left-right) and religious 
(secular-Islamic) splits are less prevalent and instead a linguistic-national split has 
surfaced between the Turks and numerically superior North African migrants48 
(Yalcin-Heckman, 1997).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The political institutions of nation-states continue to have an impact on the way that 
migrant groups are able to mobilise politically in the host-society. The political 
opportunity approach helps us to understand why migrant mobilisation takes different 
expressions, modes and courses of action. Focusing on how states do, or do not, 
provide particular institutional channels for participation impacts on the possibilities 
that migrants have to exercise influence in the host society. The Turks in the 
Netherlands have since the 1980s enjoyed a situation of fairly inclusive state policies, 
although the exact level of influence still needs to be evaluated, which has allowed 
organised Turkish interests to participate on par with native Dutch interests and other 
ethnic minority groups. In contrast, the lack of a formal platform or arena in the host 
society can either re-direct participating groups (such as the Turks in Germany) 
towards a supra-national level or towards the sending country but it can also spark 
mobilisation for increased cultural rights and group specific recognition (as in 
France).  
However, it should be pointed out that there are also some key changes 
underway with regards to how European states view citizenship and, especially, how 
they view ethnic political participation. Citizenship has moved away from being a 
primarily legal term expressing the relationship between the individual, the state and 
the territory, to also be a prominent feature in the integration debate. European states 
are now at a stage where they have to decide whether citizenship is a tool for 
integration or whether to go down the North American route and use citizenship as a 
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reward to be handed out to ‘successfully integrated’ migrants. The debate around 
citizenship has also shifted away from being primarily about rights and opportunities 
and towards an emphasis on active citizenship and its key role for social cohesion. 
The re-emphasis of citizenship can be explained with reference to two particular 
events. First, as an effect of immigration developing into a security issue. Migration, 
it is argued, has become a security concern and can pose new types of threat to the 
state (or even Western democratic values more generally). This process has further 
meant that issues relating to migration have started to move beyond the established 
rules of the political game and are now framed as issues which require either special 
measures or are considered to be above politics. As a security threat, the state can thus 
justify the use of extraordinary measures, e.g. giving state institutions increased 
powers to remove citizenship.  Second, as a reaction to perceived failures of 
multicultural politics. The reasoning behind these arguments suggest that, on the one 
hand, becoming a citizen should mean more than merely acquiring a new passport and 
references are made to factors such as lack of social cohesion and problems of ethnic 
segregation. On the other, critics suggest that multiculturalism has had an isolating 
effect and contributed to extremism which is a point that has been particular 
prominent in the Netherlands.  
These developments are likely to impact on the type of mobilisation that 
occurs and on the relationship that particular migrant groups have with the host 
society. Current trends could point towards a direction in which ‘ethnically exclusive’ 
participation will become increasingly more difficult for groups such as the Turks 
since host societies will be more concerned with migrants showing that they are 
properly integrated and participating in and through mainstream channels. An 
indicative development can be found in the increasing use of integration ‘tests’ that 
states are introducing as a requirement for naturalisation. Although many states 
believe that additional integration courses and tests are beneficial, it remains unclear 
as to exactly how these new measures are to achieve ‘better integration’ and what the 
connection to national identity is. However, these integration requirements may not 
solely serve as a way to filter out unwanted citizens, but could also aim to facilitate 
the political participation of migrants as citizens-to-be by providing them with 
necessary skills such as language and information on migrants’ rights and 
responsibilities.   
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